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JURISDICTION 
This Court h a s jurisdict ion p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) 
(2008), as well a s a n order granting petition for interlocutory appeal entered 
December 8, 2008 . (R. 177). 
ISSUE PRESENTED. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Ms. Olson agrees tha t the s t andard of review for the issue presented on 
appeal is properly s tated by the Utah Depar tment of Health in its Appellate Brief. 
Ms. Olson also agrees tha t the i ssue presented for review was properly preserved. 
(Dept.'s App. Brf., pp . 2-3). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
In addition to the s ta tu tory provision identified by the Utah Department of 
Health and a t tached a s Addendum "B" to its brief, the following provision is 
determinative: 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3 .1 (1 ) (Supp. 2008). 
The full text of § 67-19-3.1 is a t tached a s Addendum "A" to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of t h e Case and Dispos i t ion below 
This case arose from a disciplinary action, a demotion implemented 
against Ms. Olson by Appellant Utah Depa r tmen t of Health ("the 
Department") . The disciplinary action, effective September 25 , 2006, 
demoted Ms. Olson from the Director of the B u r e a u of Managed Health Care 
to an a s s i s t an t researcher . 1 On May 16, 2007 , nearly 8 mon ths later, and 
only four b u s i n e s s days prior to an evidentiary hear ing before the Career 
Services Review Board ("CSRB") to which a grievant is entitled, the 
Depar tmen t sen t a letter to Ms. Olson purpor t ing to rescind the demotion 
and s imul taneously moved to dismiss the grievance. The CSRB therefore 
determined it no longer h a d jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, applying 
the Depar tment ' s reasoning tha t the reass ignment no longer consti tuted a 
"demotion" grievable u n d e r the applicable ru les . Ms. Olson appealed the 
CSRB decision to the Third District Court ("Trial Court"). 
1
 The Department does not dispute that its action against Ms. Olson was 
a demotion, but argues that the action later evolved into something other than a 
demotion. Therefore, although Ms. Olson argues the transfer always was and still 
is a demotion, to avoid any unnecessary conflict in further briefing or oral 
argument, this brief will refer to the action as "the reassignment." 
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The Department filed a motion for summary judgment before the Trial 
Court, arguing that the CSRB correctly determined it did not have 
jurisdiction over the grievance because the action taken pursuant to the 
May 16, 2007 letter no longer rendered the employment action a "demotion" 
under § 67-19-3(7)(a) of the Utah State Personnel Management Act ("the 
Act"). Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a), et seq. (Supp. 2008). In opposition 
to the Department's motion, Ms. Olson argued that the reassignment still 
constituted a "demotion" even after the May 16 letter. The Trial Court 
properly adopted Ms. Olson's argument and denied the motion for summary 
judgment. The case is now before this Court on an interlocutory appeal. 
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B. S t a t e m e n t of Facts 2 
1. On Ju ly 27, 2006, Ms. Olson received a proposed disciplinary 
action in the form of a demotion (dated Ju ly 19, 2006) from the 
Depar tment . (R. 96-97). 
2. Prior to the Ju ly 27, 2006 letter, in more t han 25 years of 
employment with the State of Utah, nearly 13 of which were for the 
Depar tment , Ms. Olson had never so m u c h as received a negative employee 
review. (R. 3). 
3 . On September 25 , 2006, David Sundwall , M.D., Executive 
Director for the Depar tment , i ssued a final decision formally inst i tut ing the 
demotion, demoting Ms. Olson from the Director of the Bureau of Managed 
2
 Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the 
facts section should include those facts "relevant to the issues presented for 
review." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7). The Department presents only one issue for review, 
whether the Trial Court properly determined that a "disciplinary" transfer is a 
demotion under the Act if it does not reduce the current wage. However, in the 
body of its brief, the Department also asks the Court to overturn its decision in 
Draughon v. Dept of Financial Institutions, State of Utah, 1999 UT App. 42; 975 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999), which does not address the issue of whether a 
"disciplinary" transfer constitutes a demotion. (Briefed further Infra). Although it 
is outside the issue presented for review on appeal, in case this Court determines 
to address Draughon, Ms. Olson includes facts in her "statement of facts" relevant 
to that case. 
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Health Care to a Research Consultant, an assistant researcher, effective 
September 27, 2006. (R. 3). 
4. Ms. Olson filed a Request for Agency Action as part of her 
grievance, pursuant to which an evidentiary hearing was ultimately 
scheduled for May 22 and 23, 2007. (R. 3-4). 
5. On Wednesday, May 16, 2007, only four business days before 
her evidentiary hearing, the Department sent a letter purporting to rescind 
the demotion and simultaneously filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Olson's 
grievance, arguing that based on the letter, the CSRB no longer had 
jurisdiction to hear the grievance. (R. 30; 104-106). 
6. The evidentiary hearing was cancelled and on June 7, 2007, 
Robert W. Thompson, CSRB Administrator, issued the final agency action 
underlying this case, adopting the Department's reasoning that the CSRB 
no longer had jurisdiction. (R. 8-16). 
7. The action taken via the May 16, 2007 letter left Ms. Olson as 
an assistant researcher and did not restore her to the previous salary range 
that went along with the wage she earned in the position of Director of 
Bureau of Managed Health Care. (R. 119). 
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8. The salary range a t tached to the wage Ms. Olson e a r n s in her 
current position both s ta r t s and ends at a lower salary t h a n tha t a t tached 
to her previous position, which is the case even after the May 16, 2007 
letter. (R. 120). 
9. The disciplinary reasons for initiating the demotion remained in 
tact even after the May 16 letter, a s the sole reason for the Depar tment ' s 
letter and related motion to dismiss was "based u p o n the cost to and 
disruption of [the] office involved in responding to [Ms. Olson's] grievance." 
(R. 30). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Trial Court properly found tha t Ms. Olson's reass ignment 
was a "demotion/7 even after the Depar tment ' s alleged retract ion 
of the demotion because even then, it r emained the case tha t 
the reass ignment was for disciplinary reasons . Therefore, the 
Trial Court ' s denial of the Depar tment ' s s u m m a r y judgmen t 
should be affirmed. 
II. Although it is irrelevant to the i ssue presen ted on appeal , the 
Depar tment also raises the case of Draughon v. Dept. of 
Financial Institutions, State of Utah, 1999 UT App. 42; 975 P.2d 
9 3 5 (Utah App. 1999). Nonetheless, if the Court chooses to 
address tha t case, it should be affirmed because tha t case 
serves the express legislative in tent of, inter alia, providing for 
the fair administrat ion of h u m a n resources . 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
REASSIGNMENT CONSTITUTES A DEMOTION EVEN AFTER 
THE MAY 2 0 0 7 LETTER. THAT RULING SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
The Trial Court properly ruled tha t because the disciplinary reasons 
for the r eas s ignmen t remained in place even after the May 16 letter, the 
reass ignment is still a "demotion" u n d e r the Act. The relevant provision 
reads: 
(a) "Demotion" m e a n s a disciplinary action 
resul t ing in a reduction of an employee's 
cu r ren t ac tual wage. 
(b) "Demotion" does not mean : 
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of 
a n employee to ano the r position 
without a reduct ion in the cur ren t 
ac tual wage . . . . 
U.C.A. § 67-19-3(7)(a) and (b)(i) (2006) (emphasis added). 
-7-
Applying the plain language of subsect ion (b)(i), Ju l ie ' s reass ignment 
is still a demotion in t h a t it r emains a "disciplinary/ ' a s opposed to a 
"nondisciplinary" movement . 3 Although the Depa r tmen t would have this 
Court ignore the t e rm "nondisciplinary/ ' the Court m u s t consider tha t term 
and p re sume the Legislature u sed it advisedly. See Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 
UT App. 58 , t 12; 180 P.3d 188, 191 (Utah App. 2008) (citations omitted) 
(court p r e s u m e s Legislature used each word advisedly and each word is 
given effect). Moreover, the word "nondisciplinary" is a qualifying term, 
clearly qualifying the t e rm "movement" and Cour ts give effect to qualifying 
t e rms when in terpre t ing a s t a tu te . See Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 
568 P.2d 738 , 741 (Utah 1977); State v. Navaro, 26 P.2d 955 (Utah 1933). 
Here, Ms. Olson w a s reassigned for disciplinary reasons , which 
remains the case even after the May 16, 2007 letter. In fact, the May 16 
letter m a k e s clear t h a t the discipline remained the basis of the 
3
 Should the Court determine that the plain language of the definition 
means what the Department contends it does, so as to include disciplinary 
transfers, exceptions to the plain language rule should be applied to adopt the 
definition as argued by Ms. Olson. Those exceptions are fleshed out under the 
second section of this brief. Therefore, although those exceptions are equally 
applicable to this section of the argument, if arguendo the Department's definition 
was accepted as the "plain language," to avoid duplicating arguments, they will 
not be briefed here. 
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reassignment and that the purported retraction of the demotion was done 
solely to avoid responding to her grievance. Specifically, the letter states: 
"This decision is based upon the cost to and disruption of our office 
involved in responding to your grievance." R. 30 (emphasis added). 
Because the reassignment was a disciplinary, rather than a 
"nondisciplinary" movement, the reassignment is a "demotion" under the 
statute. 
Moreover, the Department's interpretation of "demotion" that would 
exclude disciplinary transfers from the definition fails to satisfy the 
Legislature's specific goals set forth in § 67-19-3.1(2) of the Act, which 
require the definition to be interpreted according to identified principles 
including, but not limited to the 'fair treatment of applicants and 
employees in all aspects of human resource administration." U C.A. 
§ 67-19-3.1(1). The Legislature, through the Act, specifically requires 
courts to interpret all provisions of subsection (1) (which includes the 
provision that defines "demotion") with this and other goals in mind, 
instructing: "[T]he principles in subsection (1) shall govern the 
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interpretation and implementation of this chapter." Id. (2) (emphasis 
added). 
The Department's proposed interpretation of "demotion" to exclude 
disciplinary transfers directly contradicts the principles specifically outlined 
by the Legislature. Specifically,, defining "demotion" as the Department 
would define that term fails to provide for fair treatment of employees in the 
administration of human resources. Under the Department's definition, an 
employee could be transferred as a means of discipline and as long as the 
hourly pay remained the same, the employee would have absolutely no 
avenue to grieve the discipline. In this case specifically, the Department's 
definition of demotion, if accepted, will allow the Department to take an 
employee who has dedicated more than 25 years of her life to the State of 
Utah, stick her in a corner researching and essentially saying to her: You 
have no rights after all your years of dedication as a public employee. Jus t 
sit in your corner, do your research and keep to yourself. 
Moreover, it can hardly be considered fair treatment in the 
administration of human resources if the definition of "demotion" can be 
used by the Department to cause a grievant to incur extensive time and 
-10-
expense to no avail. On Wednesday, May 16, 2007, only four bus iness days 
before her evidentiary hearing, the Depar tment got the hear ing cancelled 
by purportedly rescinding the demotion. By the time the hearing was 
cancelled, Ms. Olson h a d spen t countless hour s and incurred a significant 
amoun t of a t torneys fees preparing for the hearing.4 Therefore, the Trial 
Court 's ruling should be affirmed because determining tha t Ms. Olson's 
transfer was a demotion, even after the purpor ted rescission, is consistent 
with express legislative intent , as well as the Legislatures ins t ruct ions for 
construing the definition of "demotion/ ' 
IL IF THE COURT DETERMINES TO GO BEYOND THE ISSUE 
OF "DISCIPLINARY" VS. "NONDISCIPLINARY" TRANSFERS 
AND REVISIT DRAUGHON, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM 
THAT DECISION. 
Draughon is inapplicable to the issue presented to this Court for 
review on appeal . Draughon does not address whether a transfer is a 
demotion if done for disciplinary, vs. nondisciplinary, r easons . Rather, tha t 
case addressed whether a transfer is a demotion if it s tr ips the employee of 
4
 Ms. Olson is aware that attorneys fees are not recoverable in a grievance. 
However, there is no better example of the unfair administration of human 
resources. It is patently unfair to allow Ms. Olson to expend such extensive time 
and money only to pull the rug out from under her four days before the hearing. 
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more than immediate pay. Draughon, 1999 UT App. 42, t1f 9-10; 975 P.2d 
at 938. Although that question was briefed below, the Court did not rule 
on it and the Department did not present that as an issue for review in its 
statement of the issue on appeal. (Dept.'s App. Brf., p. 2). In fact, the Trial 
Court specifically stated in its ruling that Draughon was not applicable to 
the case at hand. R. 170. However, should the Court choose to revisit 
Draughon, that case should be affirmed. 
In Draughon this Court determined that a "demotion" of a public 
employee is an involuntary transfer to a position with less status, fewer 
responsibilities, a lower pay range and which results in commensurately 
less benefits. Id. That definition should be affirmed for two reasons. First, 
despite the Department's contention to the contrary, the reassignment 
stripped Ms. Olson of the current actual wage she earned as a bureau 
director. The salary range attached to the wage Ms. Olson earns in her 
current position both starts and ends at a lower salary than that attached 
to her previous position, which is the case even after the May 16, 2007 
letter. Julie's maximum compensation as a Research Consultant is much 
-12-
less than a bureau director, thus depriving her of the competitive 
compensation she had in the position. 
Applying ' 'current actual wage" as including aspects of an employee's 
income other than just hourly pay, serves the legislative goal of providing 
for "equitable and competitive compensation." The Department's effort to 
separate what attaches with Ms. Olson's wage fails to serve the Legislature's 
express intent and further fails to consider the entire statutory scheme in 
harmony. Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, \ 9; 173 P.3d 
166, 169 (Utah 2007) (language of any specific statutory provision should 
be read in harmony with other provisions in same statute) (citations 
omitted). 
Second, even if, arguendo, the Department was correct that the plain 
language of current actual wage is synonymous with current hourly pay and 
nothing more, the Court should decline to apply the plain language rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that there are exceptions to the 
plain language rule. Specifically, the Supreme Court has instructed: 
Normally, where the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to 
give effect to that plain meaning. However, "[a]n 
equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule 
-13-
states that a court should not follow the literal 
language of a statute if its plain meaning works an 
absurd result." 
State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, \ 11; 165 P.3d 1206, 1209 (Utah 2007) 
(citations in original) (quoting Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, J^ 18; 
104 P.3d 1242, 1248 (Utah 2004). Courts should also disregard the plain 
language of statutory provision if it is unreasonably confused, inoperable or 
in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute. Id. (citation 
omitted). As detailed above, the Department's definition is in blatant 
contravention of the express purposes of the Act. 
Moreover, applying the plain language rule to the definition of 
demotion as the Department argues it should be defined, would lead to 
absurd results. As detailed above, this would permit the Department to 
discipline an employee, in this case a bureau director, by sticking her in 
front of a computer to research, stripping her of everything she has worked 
for in the past 25 years, essentially telling her she has no rights and should 
just keep to herself. 
In a further effort to get Draughon overturned, the Department argues 
that the Legislature drafted the current definition of "demotion" to overrule 
-14-
that decision. The Department provides absolutely no legislative history or 
any other evidence to support that argument; it is mere speculation. 
Notably, the relevant provision was not even amended until 2006, seven 
years after Draughon. Therefore, there is no evidence that the definition 
was an attempt by the Legislature to overturn Draughon. In fact, to the 
contrary, the Draughon decision is consistent with the specific Legislative 
intent stated in the Act, so the Legislature would obviously not want that 
case overturned. 
In sum, affirming the Draughon definition of "demotion" avoids the 
absurd results discussed above and serves the express Legislative purpose 
of the entire statutory scheme. Therefore, if the Court in fact revisits 
Draughon, it should affirm that decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the statutory definition, Ms. Olson's reassignment was 
and still is a "demotion" because it was done for disciplinary reasons, which 
remained the case even after the May 16, 2007 letter. On that basis alone, 
the Trial Court's ruling should be affirmed. In addition, if the Court 
determines to revisit Draughon, that decision should be affirmed. 
-15-
Overturning Draughon would lead to absurd results and would fly in the 
face of specifically identified legislative goals. Therefore, the Trial Court's 
denial of the Department's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed and the case remanded for entry of an order transferring the case 
back to the jurisdiction of the CSRB. 
DATED this 6 th day of March, 2009. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
NAN T. BASSET? 
Attorney for Julie Ann Olson 
-16-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify t h a t on the 6 th day of March, 2009 , a t rue and correct 
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Plaint i f f /Respondent was served, via 
h a n d delivery, upon the following: 
Glen E. Davies 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
Sixth Floor 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140856 




Page 1 of2 
Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 §67-19-3.1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 67. State Officers and Employees 
^ Chapter 19. Utah State Personnel Management Act (Refs & Annos) 
_^ § 67-19-3.1. Principles guiding interpretation of chapter and adoption of 
rules 
(1) The department shall establish a career service system designed in a manner 
that will provide for the effective implementation of the following merit prin-
ciples : 
(a) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of their relat-
ive ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of qualified 
applicants for initial appointment; 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensation; 
(c) training employees as needed to assure high-quality performance; 
(d) retaining employees on the basis of the adequacy of their performance and 
separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected; 
(e) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of human resource 
administration without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
political affiliation, age, or disability, and with proper regard for their pri-
vacy and constitutional rights as citizens; 
(f) providing information to employees regarding their political rights and the 
prohibited practices under the Hatch Act; [FN1] and 
(g) providing a formal procedure for processing the appeals and grievances of 
employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or reprisal. 
(2) The principles in Subsection (1) shall govern interpretation and implementa-
tion of this chapter. 
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